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Swedish Social Welfare and its Application to American Welfare Systems concerns itself 
with the issue of determining the origins of the modern Swedish social welfare system.  
Additionally, the causes behind the formation of the system are evaluated for their relevancy 
concerning the formation of the American welfare system.  Multiple areas of study are 
considered, including racial impacts, economic factors, sociological impactors, and demographic 
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 In America, the average inpatient day, regardless whether the hospital is for-profit or 
non-profit, commonly costs an average of more than 2,000 dollars per day.  Arkansas, despite 
being one of the cheaper states in which to go to the hospital, averages a cost of more than 1,500 
dollars per inpatient day.  (Rappleye 2015)  Average hospital stays in America cost 10,400 
dollars and run around 4-5 days total.  (Elixhauser and Weiss, 2012)  These visits alone, 
consisting of only a part of the private citizen health care spending in the country, not only affect 
a large portion of the population but also constitute a significant impact on the economy of the 
United States.  In 2012 alone, 36.5 million people were hospitalized, or 116 per 1,000 
population.  This resulted in an economic cost of more than 370 billion dollars.   
The International Federation of Health Plans, in a 2012 report, found that the price of an 
average day in an average American hospital was as costly as a similar daylong stay in a hospital 
in the countries of Argentina, Spain, South Africa, the Netherlands, France, Chile, New Zealand, 
and Australia combined.  At the same time, the same report noted that out of all these countries, 
in 2010, the United States, despite its emphasis on the presumed efficiencies of privatized health 
insurance, spent 17% of its GDP on health spending-the OECD average is 9.5% for the same 
year, and the closest any of the above countries comes to America’s figure is France; far, far 
back at 11.6%.  (International Federation of Health Plans 2012)  
The World Bank estimates American total health expenditure, which is “the sum of 
public and private health expenditure… it covers the provision of health services (preventive and 
curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for 
health” at 17.1% from the period from 2010-2015.  (World Bank 2016) At the same time, in the 
notorious WHO ranking from 2000 concerning the quality of various countries healthcare 
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systems, America came in 37
th
, despite being first in expenditure per capita.  (Blackstone and 
Taylor, 2012) One cannot help but take these facts, and others, into consideration, see the 
underperformance and the overspending, and wonder if there is not some way to make 
improvements on the American medical welfare system.  
 Among scholars seeking to analyze the effects of the American welfare system, 
comparison is often easily made to the “welfare states” common among developed in places like 
Europe.  This can have a range of meanings; people might refer to Canada’s nearly free public 
health care, or the high taxes-high benefits states common in the Nordic countries and to a 
certain degree across the European mainland.  A welfare state is defined by Merriam Webster as 
“a social system in which a government is responsible for the economic and social welfare of its 
citizens and has policies to provide free health care, support for the unemployed, etc.; also : a 
country that has such a system”. (Merriam-Webster 2016) This can obviously apply to varying 
degrees; America has enacted numerous policies with the intent to provide for the economic and 
physical well-being of its citizenry, as have many other developed countries.  At the same time, 
however, the degree of implementation and the focus placed on these policies can vary from 
place to place.  As such, it is essential in the examination of an alternative to the modern 
American welfare system that a social welfare state be found that can be considered a strong 
example of a different approach than that taken by the United States.   
In searching for a strong contrast to the capitalist focused American welfare system, the 
Nordic countries are the first to come to mind for many academics.  Commonly the first 
countries thought of when the phrase “social welfare state” is put forth, the Nordics are famous 
for their pioneering modernization combined with efficient social welfare policies.  To quote the 
Economist in 2013, “If you had to be reborn anywhere in the world as a person with average 
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talents and income, you would want to be a Viking.” (Economist 2013) The question then 
becomes which specific country is the best selection as a counterpart.  Sweden is the immediate 
logical conclusion-the largest population, landmass, economy, and a long social and political 
history.  In short, it provides the largest population and sample size for comparison to the 
gigantic statistical enterprise that is the analysis of the United States.  The increase in sample size 
also serves to ameliorate potential error in both quantitative statistical records and data gathering, 
and in qualitative evaluation, both independent and based on these aforementioned statistics.   
Having arrived at a study site to research, the question now presents itself: How did 
Sweden arrive at its modern iteration of a welfare state? During what period did the social 
welfare state come into its modern form?  And, primarily, what factors contributed significantly 
to the formation of the social welfare state, and, concerning the comparison with the United 
States, are these same formative factors identifiable in the history of that country?  In short, what 
are the factors necessary for the formation of a Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same 
factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the United States?   
That America is at a crossroads of social welfare policy is clear.  Popular support for the 
Obama presidency despite his avowed intent to implement the PPACA (Obamacare) 
demonstrated a significant popular support for increased social welfare policy in the European 
vein.  (Pew Research Center 2015)  At the same time, inequality and vested interests interfering 
in government activities are experiencing a significant increase; and these are problems 
specifically opposed by Scandinavian states and Sweden in particular, and problems important to 
a significant portion of American citizenry as well, as evidenced by the popular success of 
candidates performing well in elections occupying roles of “government outsiders”.  (Silver 
2016)   
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That the area of study responsible for undertaking this analysis be geography is of 
essential import to the overall function of the analysis.  Social welfare, in a sense, manifests as a 
reflection of scale.  Specifically, Sweden, a smaller, more homogenous society, which is also 
geographically less significant than the larger and more diverse United States, possesses fewer 
racial and cultural boundaries to obstruct the implementation of more egalitarian social 
programs.   
At the same time, the issue of health care is very much an issue spanning multiple 
spheres of analysis.  Geography, as the discipline perhaps most suited to analysis across spheres 
as varying as economic history and societal racism, is uniquely suited as the optimal lens through 
which to evaluate the matter of the origin and evolution of Swedish social welfare, and by 
extension, its American counterpart.  The flexibility to evaluate and assess how different study 
areas interact and effect each other within the overall sphere of social welfare is of paramount 
importance.   
The status of America as a world leader is very, very much in question concerning its 
performance in the simple health care and benefits afforded to its citizens.  Geographic study of 
the formational variables behind the rise of the modern-day Swedish welfare state system can be 
essential not only in determining the formational variables of an academically valuable study 
site, but in providing a crucial research aid in the study of and application of solutions to 
America’s modern day welfare issues-solutions that are sorely needed as the health insurance 






 At its heart, geography is a multidisciplinary science.  Sub-focuses of the field of 
geography range from innovative geospatial analysis techniques to the studious analysis of 
resource exploitation, the study of political systems, the settling of cities, and a hundred other 
applications.  It is thus that I posit the appropriateness of geography in being the correct, and 
only, discipline with which to utilize the almost multidisciplinary approach necessary to analyze 
the formation of Swedish welfare.   
When one asks the question “what are the factors necessary for the formation of a 
Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the 
United States” one cannot say, for example, that “This answer is economic in nature”, or “This 
answer can be answered solely by an analysis of Swedish demographics”.    To do so is to ignore 
the wealth of alternative formative influences on such a collection of institutions that would 
irretrievably diminish the legitimacy of the research.   
At the same time, such a narrow focus on a single area of study lends credence to the idea 
that such singular interest on a single topic area in regard to such a broad a subject as the 
formation of Swedish social welfare, with so many influencing factors, leaves wide open the 
possibility that factors deemed significant by their role within the single topic  area may result in 
the attribution of significance to historical progressions and events that may be insignificant 
when one steps back to understand the multidisciplinary inputs required to truly understand the 
formative influences of the welfare state.  For example, the Swedish timber industry in the 19
th
 
century was a major part of the Swedish economy.  In 1850, timber accounted for 15% of 
Swedish exports-a mere two decades later, it accounted for more than half of the Swedish export 
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market, and the export value had increased by three  times over.  (Östlund 1995) At first glance, 
when examined among the spectrum of the economic history of Sweden, this may seem a crucial 
economic step in the evolution of Sweden as a country; but stepping back, the question as to its 
significance in the formation of the Swedish welfare state arises.  If lumped under the common 
banner of Swedish industrialization-itself wildly important in its impact on modern day Sweden-
much as with every industrialized country-19
th
 century timber statistics lose a certain measure of 
their perceived importance when viewed through a narrow economic-only lens.  
 The point is not that economics is an unimportant subject matter, or that individual 
subject areas are insignificant in comparison to some greater gestalt approach.  Rather, the 
argument is that all of the individual spheres of influence on the formation of the Swedish 
welfare state are anything but insignificant.  However, they must be analyzed in such a way as to 
keep the multifactorial nature of the formative processes of the welfare state in mind, lest the 
quantitative statistics and the qualitative conclusions stray into the realm of insignificance or risk 
error based on insignificant data points.  (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993) To explain the 
direction of the analysis in a spatial sense, it is important to take into account the nature of 
Sweden as an entire spatial entity as being critical in the formation of its modern-day welfare 
state form.  In this vein of significance and a multidisciplinary approach, the methods of 
approach concerning the analysis of the Swedish welfare state formation have been deemed 
critical by a variety of academics.  The question arises; which areas should be focused on? In a 
review of the work of noted social welfare state researcher Harold Wilensky by Martin Danzig, 
Danzig notes the crucial nature of Wilensky’s multidirectional approach to the issues underlying 
the formation of the social welfare states that he studies.  He argues the interrelated significance 
of economic, political, and social/demographic factors.  (Danzig 1977) Multiple other scholars, 
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such as Daniel Bell and Arthur Vidich utilize a similar multidisciplinary approach also using the 
same methodology. It is thus proposed that it is only logical to assume the heightened efficacy of 
a multidisciplinary examination of the formative factors behind 20
th
 century Swedish welfare 
policy implementation.       
The Formational Period of the Swedish Welfare System 
  In analyzing the formational factors of the Swedish welfare state, an understanding of the 
relevant time period is paramount.  The temporal scale of the research cannot be ignored if the 
correct time period, and thus the correct factors, are to be taken into consideration.  Different 
spheres of influence may have different respective time periods, but an overall, comprehensive, 
multifaceted analysis must present an inclusive timeframe with which to analyze the formation 
of Swedish social welfare.  Schall identifies the social aspects of the formation of the welfare 
state as extending back to the mid-1920s, and lasting until the mid-1970s and the first significant 
wave of immigration to Sweden and the subsequently increasing heterogeneity of the population.  
(Schall 2016)  Hancock, in 1976, argued a generalized formational time period starting at the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century, in line with increasing industrialization and the rise of the Social 
Democrat party.  (Hancock 1977)  Schiff argues the significant time period of welfare policy 
formation began with the rise of the Social Democratic party to power in 1932.  (Schiff 1974)  In 
The Small Giant, Carl Gustavson places the weight of importance strongly on the preindustrial 
period before World War One, and additionally on the formative period between World War One 
and the start of the 1980s.  (Gustavson 1986) Heclo and Madsen, in Policy and Politics in 
Sweden, assign the welfare state a formative period lasting the duration of what they deem 
noteworthy policy implementation, from 1909-1978.  (Heclo and Madsen, 1987))  As 
summarized by Eric Einhorn, noted researcher of the Swedish welfare state Sven Olsson posits 
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the end of the Swedish welfare state formational period as the start of the 1970s.  (Einhorn 1992)  
Regardless of the formative periods espoused by these varying academics, the same theme is 
seen throughout; that of the alleged formative period varying depending on which singular 
element they espouse as the most critical to welfare state formation; be it politics, social 
pressure, homogeneity of the population, or an increase in economic activity.   
Prior Research on the Swedish Welfare State 
Carly Elizabeth Schall notes the importance of the political aspects of the foundation of 
the social welfare state, along with the interrelated importance of the demographic situation in 
Sweden.   Schall argues that not only was the welfare state founded on a populist political 
motivation, but also that the aforementioned political drive was concocted in large part through 
an emphasis of the homogeneity of the population.  She also argues that not only is the Swedish 
welfare state unique in that it was designed specifically for the Swedish population, by the 
Swedish population, but also that the nation of Sweden and the culture of Sweden have come to 
be defined to some degree by their chosen form of welfare policy implementation; a concept she 
labels as the welfare “stateification of Swedishness”.  (Schall 2016)  Valocchi argues that unique 
Swedish circumstances leading to reduced inequality and heightened sensitivity to agrarian work 
sector demands led to a broader implementation of welfare state policy, or at least engendered 
the idea of such activity, until it was driven into being by the Social Democrats.  (Valocchi 1992)  
Sven Olsson, as reviewed by Eric Einhorn, argues, among other things, that industrialization 
paved the way for solidarity among the industrializing Sweden population.   Olsson also rejects 
Harvard historian Peter Baldwin’s assertion that Swedish conservatives were responsible for the 
main driving thrust of Swedish welfare state policy implementation in the post-World War Two 
era.  (Einhorn 1992)  In this he indirectly reaffirms the repeated theme of Social Democratic 
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importance in the political sphere of the formation of the Swedish welfare state.  In a study 
produced by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, the researchers argue that homogeneity 
drives the social welfare impetus at the political level in European-style welfare states, ostensibly 
including the homogenous Sweden.  (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)  In total, however, 
very few of these studies, however, devote anything but lip service to other spheres of influence 
on the formation of the welfare state system as being anything but secondary to the overall 
importance of political and their associated demographic factors, or vice versa, and none of them 
focus on anything more than their primary position of focus.   
Economically, a wealth of studies exists in regard to the Swedish social welfare system as 
to beggar the imagination, much of it produced by the formidable Swedish academic machine 
itself.  In regard to the formation of formation of the Swedish welfare state and its economic 
drivers, numerous different studies have arisen.  In An Economic History of Sweden, Lars 
Magnusson cites, among a comprehensive discussion of a vast multitude of factors concerning 
Swedish economic evolution, the industrialization of Sweden as being crucial to the 
implementation of the social policies that would drive the rise of the modern-day welfare state.  
(Magnusson 2000, 177) Milner writes in Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice that the rise of 
the Swedish welfare state started with the economic advantages afforded by state moderation of 
economic policy.  (Milner 1989 22-33) Sandberg and Steckel argue the industrialization in 
Sweden led directly to a higher quality of life through the instrument of social welfare reform.  
(Sandberg and Steckel 132)  Borg and Vedin argue that Swedish technological advances co-
occurring with and driving the Industrial Revolution helped Sweden to achieve the enviable 
economic conditions it enjoyed during the post-World War Two era, when combined with their 
lack of involvement in either World War.  The lack of infrastructure destruction in either World 
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War deserves mention as a driver of the following uptick in economic fortune in Sweden.  Borg 
and Vedin are among a few of the many who espouse the importance of this fortune in driving 
future economic development and prosperity.  (Borg and Vedin 1982) 
That the formational aspects of Swedish welfare are as described is unsurprising-
economics, social factors, politics and demographics are core principles driving state formation 
in the modern era, and have done the same back through history for thousands of years.  At the 
same time, that none of these variables are analyzed en masse as a greater combined formative 
influence is surprising.  In this narrow focus can be seen a paucity in previous research, a 
weakness needing to be addressed by a more comprehensive analysis taking into account the 
potential for multiple significant influences on policy implementation.  That such a narrow focus 
has been taken by so many leading researchers of the Swedish social welfare state is surprising, 
and perhaps a result of the lack of geographically centered analysis, which can trend towards 
more the lacking multidisciplinary analysis perhaps more appropriate to the specified research 
question at hand.   
Prior Analysis on the American Welfare State 
 That the American welfare state lags behind in its degree of implementation in 
comparison to many European countries and other OECD nations is unsurprising.  The American 
welfare state has been described as “reluctant” by Harold Wilensky, “a semi-welfare state” by 
Bruce Jansson, a “welfare state laggard” by Michael Katz, “a residual welfare state” by Robert 
Kudrle and Theodore Marmor, and an “incomplete welfare state” by Diane Sainsbury.  (Howard 




 At the same time, direct comparisons between the foundational factors of the Swedish 
welfare system and the American welfare system are remarkable only in their complete absence.  
Yves Bourdet noted sourly the academic disinterest for research into the viability of other 
economic approaches as a result of a proposed American-centered domination of economic 
analysis in the 20
th
 century.  Even Bourdet’s collection of studies comparing the Swedish model 
with other countries only extended to an analysis of Sweden in relation to other European 
countries that ostensibly display a much greater proximity to the generalized Swedish social 
welfare ideal than would the United States.  (Bourdet 1992, 2)  Studies have been produced that 
have attempted to analyze the formative factors behind American social welfare policy, such as 
the Harvard Institute of Economics study titled “Why Doesn’t the US have a European-style 
Welfare State”, but direct comparison to Sweden and a true multidisciplinary analysis have been 
lacking.  (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001) 
 In summary, it is thus posited that two key gaps exist in the modern research collection 
concerning the study of Swedish social welfare and the factors significant in its formation, and 
their subsequent potential mirrored applications to the United States.  Firstly, the comprehensive 
analysis of the significant formational drivers of Swedish social welfare, while heavily analyzed 
by the academic community, is lacking in multidisciplinary analyses, and even more so in 
analyses that take into account more than one potential variable, and even then, variables are 
often to intertwined as to consist of a single thought process, for example, sociopolitical.  
Additionally, direct comparison of the multidisciplinary factors behind (specifically) Swedish 
social welfare policy formation with their potential mirror occurrences or lack thereof in the 
United States is a research topic particularly lacking.  Therefore, the it is contended that a gap in 
the modern research for the question of “what are the factors necessary for the formation of a 
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Swedish-style welfare state, and have the same factors co-occurred in a similar fashion in the 
United States” not only exists but is necessary for a more comprehensive analysis of the subject 



















In examining the factors leading to the formation of what is now the modern-day Swedish 
welfare state system and the potential parallels with the past, present, or future United States of 
America, one must first carefully define exactly what is meant by “welfare state”.  Encyclopedia 
Britannica describes a welfare state as being a “concept of government in which the state or a 
well-established network of social institutions plays a key role in the protection and promotion of 
the economic and social well-being of citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of 
opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail 
themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015) This 
definition, while helpful, is rather general.  In particular, we are interested in the specific factors 
leading to the formation of the Swedish welfare state, and as such, determining a more precise 
idea of the modern-day Swedish end product is imperative.  In addition, the very nature of a 
welfare state is inherently one relative to the nature of the degree to which the aforementioned 
“social institutions” (examples including the United States’ Social Security or the United 
Kingdom’s National Health Service) protect and engender the economic and social well-being of 
citizens.   
As previously stated, I will attempt to determine the key foundational roots of this 
welfare system and the degree to which it is employed in the sovereign nation of Sweden is 
based on three significant factors; political factors(including such topics as ruling party/coalition 
continuity), economics, and demographics.  At the same time, if an examination is to be made 
into the nature of these conditions for welfare state formation in regard to the viability of such a 
window for change in the climate of the past, present, or future United States, these significant 
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factors, when described in the Swedish setting, must then be presented alongside their American 
counterparts.   
Sweden Political Factors 
Viking Era 
Large-scale Viking activity is thought to have predated the sixth century C.E. and lasted 
more than 600 years into the 12-13th centuries, before internal and external pressures brought an 
end to and a transition out of pan-Nordic Viking culture.  Externally, Vikings were focused on 
acquisition through trading or warfare.  The method would depend in large part on the particular 
Vikings, be they Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, etc., and the specific groups with which they 
came into contact, be they from Western Europe, the Mediterranean region, or even the Middle 
East.  Swedish Vikings in particular were noted for their trade with the Arabs, which served to 
facilitate acquisition of silver, among other resources.  (National Museum of Denmark 2016) 
These Viking excursions, be they peaceful or warlike, would help to set the boundaries of 
Viking society.  In what would prove to be a remarkably egalitarian distribution of responsibility 
in regard to military responsibilities, regions in Viking areas were split up into areas called 
“hundreds”, with each area obligated to provide a certain number of ships and men to crew them, 
a figure crucially determined by the affluence and population of the hundred in question.  
Another cooperative, socialistic institution of the Viking Age was the development by the 
Swedish Vikings of a beacon system along the east coast of Scandinavia, with the intended 
purpose of facilitating overall sea travel.  (Jones 2001, 121) These early proto-redistributive 
programs would be precursors to the modern Swedish welfare system.   




 It was also during this period that the nascent Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, was 
slowly growing into its modern-day self.  In 1809, after a long period of marginalization of the 
Riksdag and promotion of the powers of the monarch, a new constitution was established firmly 
denoting the division of powers between the king and the parliament.  A separation of different 
branches of government-judicial, legislative, and executive, was established, along with the 
granted independence of courts and public authorities.  (Government of Sweden 2016b)  In 1865, 
the Riksdag became a bicameral body, consisting of an upper house of mostly wealthy elites and 
nobility, while the lower house was open to more middle-class representatives.  (Government of 
Sweden 2016b)   By this time, suffragist movements were gaining traction in Swedish society, 
and by 1862, women in several differing economic groups were allowed to vote.  By the early 
1900s, these same women were allowed to hold office, and by 1918, universal suffrage in local 
elections was established.  (Government of Sweden 2016b)In the revolutionary period following 
World War One, near-universal suffrage was achieved (excepting groups such as prisoners, the 
bankrupted, and those dependent on a certain threshold of government aid) and five women were 
elected to the Riksdag in 1921.  (Government of Sweden 2016b)  This system would persist 
more or less unchanged until the two houses of the Riksdag united in 1971, and the new, modern 
day constitution was written in 1974.  The primary change to the Riksdag after this new 
constitution was established was the Speaker having a key role in the formation of coalition 
governments, and the unicameral nature of the legislative branch.   
 Examination of the Riksdag leads to the discovery of a driving force of Swedish social 
welfare reform.  That force is the Social Democrat political party, which has dominated Swedish 
politics since its first majority in parliament in 1932.  Since that election, the Social Democrats 
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have led the government for all but 16 years- a startling figure for someone more accustomed to 
American political volatility.   The Swedish political system has historically possessed a wider 
range of parties than would be expected by an average American- 5-8 parties have historically 
been represented in the legislature throughout the modern history of the Riksdag.  (Government 
of Sweden 2016b)  The Social Democrats, following a united coalition government during the 
trials of World War 2, led a relatively unaffected and unharmed Sweden into the changed post-
war climate with a remarkable amount of pragmatism and an unshakeable devotion to the 
establishment of what is today known as the Swedish model of welfare state formation.  While 
the foundation of the Swedish welfare state was laid with Depression-era policies such as the 
establishment of the old-age pension system in 1937, the vast majority of welfare policies were 
enacted in the time of relative economic prosperity following World War 2.  (European 
Commission 2013)  (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 49))  The Social Democrats have continued to 
lead Sweden through a series of coalition governments almost continuously through the 
economic crises of the 1970s and the globalization rush of the 1990s, and still lead the Swedish 









United States Political Factors 
 The youth of America as a country, along with the assortment of cultures and political 
backgrounds inherent to its immigrant populations’ countries of origin, makes the analysis of the 
political factors inherent in its policymaking a decidedly more modern affair than the more long-
lasting political entity that is Sweden.    Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of American politics 
is the historical absence of a large number of parties in presidential and congressional elections.   
By far the most telling indicator of this is the lack of successful third party candidates in 
American presidential elections throughout the history of the United States.  The modern era has 
been dominated by the Republican and Democratic parties; with the earlier decades of American 
political history seeing the competition of parties such as the Federalists, the Whigs, and the 
Democrat-Republicans.  (World Atlas 2016) Perhaps the only noteworthy third-party effort in 
American political history is Teddy Roosevelt’s attempt to run as the candidate of his own party 
upon failing to receive the Republican nomination.  Regardless, Roosevelt was defeated, and his 
campaign’s notoriety lies more or less solely in promoting the least unsuccessful third party 
candidate in American political history.   
 This state of affairs, of course, lies in sharp contrast to the aforementioned party diversity 
of Swedish politics; along with dozens of minor parties and local parties, Sweden has eight major 
parties represented in parliament; the Social Democratic, Conservative, Ecologist, Liberal, 
Agrarian, Nationalist, Christian Democratic, and Communist parties, and a current ruling 
coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party, as of the latest Riksdag election in 2014; an 
election which saw the end of the previous ruling coalition of center-right parties.  (European 
Election Database 2015)  The lack of party diversity in American directly leads to a lack of 
involvement in the voter turnout; according to the Pew Research Center, only 53.6% of the 
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population of voting age adults turned out for the 2012 presidential election, 31
st
 out of 34 
OECD countries, whereas Sweden came in third with 82.6% participation.  (DeSilver 2015)  At 
the same time, relatively convoluted American voter registration practices, in some cases a 
legacy from racism leftover from slavery issues more than a century past the Civil War, lead to 
low voter registration, and subsequently additionally infringe on voter turnout.  (Powell 1986) 
American registered voters consist of a relatively poor 71% of the voting age citizenry, 
compared to 96% for Sweden.  (DeSilver 2015)   
 A key difference in post-World War Two American and Swedish political scenes 
concerns the perceived influence of communism in the political agenda.  Whereas in the United 
States, communism was seen as the archenemy, emblematic of the rival superpower, the USSR, 
in Sweden, it was viewed through a more pragmatic lens-following the war, high-ranking and 
influential Social Democrat Gunner Myrdal postulated that major post-war depression was 
imminent, and that the only alternative to high post-war unemployment was through extensive 
government regulation and some form of command economy.  (Magnusson 2000, 221)
 Fortunately for the Swedes, this recession never materialized and the economy instead 
took off, but the lack of opposition to these claims by the leading party at the time serves to 
admirably illuminate the lack of opposition to certain aspects of communism permeating the 
government of Sweden.  In America, however, communists were labeled as spies and traitors to 
the great good of capitalism, both overtly through public spectacles such as McCarthyism, etc., 
and subconsciously with the use of propaganda and other methods.  (Belmonte 2013)  (Bernhard 
2003) At the same time, the near constant American involvement in proxy wars, along with 
direct involvement in Vietnam and Korea, in opposition to communist regimes, painted 
communism and concepts related to it as the enemy for generations of American citizens and 
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present and future/modern day policymakers. This would trickle over into a general distaste for 
policies deemed “socialist” by the general public, as seen even into the current presidential 
election with the controversy surrounding the avowed “socialist” candidate, Bernie Sanders.   
 Summarily, while United States’ government structure in a general sense is very similar 
to that of Sweden-judicial, legislative, executive-along with relatively well-educated voter bases 
and a long history of democracy, Sweden and the United States differ politically on a wide range 
of issues, be they the number of political parties, the sociological and political aversion to 
communism and its associations, or lack thereof, voter turnout, and ease of registration.  These 
differences help form the backbone delineating the differences between American social welfare 
policy and the Swedish welfare state and its associated policies.   
Swedish Economics 
Research into the economic variables surrounding the evolution of social welfare systems 
in Scandinavia has been ongoing for decades.    An argument can be made for each of what are 
conventionally considered the Scandinavian countries (Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and 
Denmark) to be selected as an ideal study site for the analysis of the economic factors 
influencing social welfare policy. Norway, with its remarkably high GDP PPP, provides a look at 
a government emphasizing Scandinavian-style social welfare with perhaps the largest amount of 
economic freedom combined with inclination to implement Scandinavian social welfare-style 
policies in the world.  No significant population size with what could be regarded as a classical 
Scandinavian style system of social policies can come close to matching the Norwegian GDP 
PPP per capita, which leaves Norway in an enviable position to act on its broad tax base in 
whatever policy-making fashion it might so choose to entertain.  This would, of course, allow for 
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the analysis of the full capacities of such policymaking ideals in an environment as unfettered as 
possible by the restraints of economic cost.   
 
Figure 1:  GDP PPP in the Scandinavian countries (CIA World Factbook 2016) 
Finland, on the other hand, offers the relatively harsher path down analysis of social 
welfare policy.  With negative GDP growth from 2013-2015, and the lowest GDP PPP, GDP, 
and GDP PPP per capita among the Scandinavian five, Finland offers a prime opportunity to 
research what policies these populations and their representatives deem most essential in a time 
of relative economic downturn, and in what is arguably, in terms of government income 
concerning available capital spending on a per capita population basis, the most trying economy 
in Scandinavia.  Admittedly, despite the negative GDP growth rate from 2013-2015,   most 
economies, and most populations, would love to be in the position Finland finds itself in terms of 
quality of life and other metrics.  Regardless, however, if one must look for the most suboptimal 
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economic conditions for policymaking among the Scandinavian options, the Finnish are the 
obvious choice.   
 It is, of course, my contention that Sweden, despite the aforementioned arguments, best 
serves as the study site through which Scandinavian social welfare policies can be best analyzed, 
along with their potential implantation, or missed implementation, in the United States.  Sweden 
is, first and foremost, the largest population among the Scandinavian countries by a significant 
margin, and covers the largest area of land in the region, coming in at just under the size of 
California, making it one of the larger European states.  Economically, the Swedes also have far 
and away outstripped their neighbors in terms of sheer economic scale, with a higher GDP, GDP 
PPP, and labor force.  The  
 
Figure 2:  GDP and GDP PPP comparison in the Scandinavian countries (World Bank 2017) 
aforementioned all-important intertwining of economic ability with the ability to enact 
meaningful social welfare policy in the modern era is a crucial aspect of the Scandinavian study 
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what is simply a larger sample size cannot be understated, given the end goal necessary to 
analyzing the overall question is the comparison of the Swedish study site with an industrializing 
and also a modern day United States of America; a much larger entity, on a much greater scale.   
Regardless, as both are highly modern, “westernized”, industrialized countries, the 
United States and Sweden have many things in common, both demographically and 
economically; however, through what in large part is a significant policy and social diversion 
between the two however, many per capita statistics; which we must use given the vast disparity 
in lump sum statistics between these two very  differently sized and populated countries,  also 
show significant departures between American and Swedish statistical patterns. 
First, economically, the United States economy dwarfs the substantial but relatively 
insignificant Swedish economy. Per capita statistical analyses, as previously mentioned, do, 
however, offer a more efficacious approach to determining the parallels between the two.  GDP 
PPP per capita numbers for both countries are relatively high, with the United States coming in 
to what would amount for second place among the Scandinavian countries.  GDP growth rate for 
both economies from 2013-2015 is also remarkably similar.  However, there are also dramatic 
statistical gaps between a large number of Swedish and American economic variables, gaps that 
will serve as useful baselines for which to analyze the overarching query.  That these statistical 
gaps are at least in part related to Scandinavian tax policy, social welfare systems, etc. is 
undeniable, but the effects of these gaps on economic dynamism, etc. is somewhat open to 
debate.  Regardless, when one compares Sweden to the United States in a variety of measures 




Figure 3: GDP PPP Per Capita comparison between the United States and Sweden (CIA World 
Factbook 2016a)  (World Bank 2017) 
very, very far apart on many metrics of economic equality.  The Swedish Gini coefficient, 
despite rising significantly in the two decades since the Scandinavian banking crises of the 
1990s, still clocks in much lower than the OECD average, and vastly lower than the American 
Gini; which, despite varying from source to source, be it the OECD report on Gini coefficients 
for 2015, Forbes 2015 data, or the Allianz report on global wealth disparity, is between the 
highest and the fourth highest in the world among what are rather universally considered 
developed countries.  (The Economist, 2012) (OECD 2016a)  (Sherman 2015) (Allianz 2015) 
Additionally, in 2015 Allianz calculated for the first time global wealth inequality, which differs 
from the Gini measurement of income inequality, but takes into account many of the same 





Figure 4: Comparison between Swedish and American government economic indicators (Allianz 
2015) 
Other measures also demonstrate the increased inequality evident in American economics 
vs. Swedish economics, where government benefits are of course more commonplace, such as 
the unemployment rate, the percent of taxes and other similar incomes as % of the national GDP, 
the budget surplus/deficit, and the percentage of public debt as a percentage of the GDP.   
 Modern day economic comparisons, while efficacious in many regards, are equaled in 
their necessity by the importance of historical economic analysis.  Firstly, a glimpse into the 
economic history of Sweden can offer crucial insight concerning the conditions surrounding and 
driving the impetus behind the formation of the economic foundation of the modern Swedish 
social system.  In sharp contrast to its status as a relatively affluent nation, Sweden has not 
always been a beacon of economic prosperity.  In 1799 the noteworthy English economist 
Thomas Malthus visited Scandinavia to gather information for the follow up work to his Essay 
on the Principles of Population, and was stunned by the breadth of the poverty he witnessed, 
noting a population barely surviving on “bark bread” and sorrel grass, and resembling so many 
“Quakers in morning”, so downtrodden was their attitude.  (Magnusson 2000, 1)  
25 
 
 Up to the beginning of the 18
th
 century, and the beginning of the onset of the 
Agricultural Revolution, Sweden was stuck in what was, for the majority of the primarily 
agrarian-based populations of northern Europe, a sort of economic/agrarian holding pattern, in 
which the majority of the harvest went towards individual consumption for the sake of simple 
survival and the rest was eaten up by an arrangement of taxes and other such fees.  Bracketed by 
the pre-agricultural boom of the very early 1700s and the noteworthy “final” famine of the 
1860s, Sweden experienced an extended and comprehensive period of agricultural productivity 
increase.  (Dribe 2003) Varying statistical contributions from a variety of Swedish scientists 
firmly illustrate the general increases in production during this time.  Eli Hekscher estimated that 
grain production increased by 75% from 1720-1815.  Gustaf Utterstrom estimated total growth in 
the production of grain and potatoes of between 60-100% during the period between 1815-1860.  
Lennart Schon estimated annual vegetable production growth of around half a percent a year 
from 1815-1850.  (Magnusson 2003, 3)  Regardless of the individual figures, however, the clear 
trend of increased agricultural yield and productivity is readily apparent.  As is the case with 
agricultural revolutions across history, increased agricultural production frees up members of the 
population to move out of the agricultural sector and into other areas of work, driving 
innovation, and in this case, Swedish industrialization, which began in earnest in the latter half of 
the 19
th
 century, and continued onwards from there, reaching its peak as Sweden emerged 
relatively unscathed from World War Two onto the greater economic world stage.   (Government 
of Sweden 2016c) 
As with many countries during the early periods of industrialization, the increased 
agricultural yield led to economic upturns in other areas.  Sweden is fortunate to contain natural 
resources crucial to industrializing societies; namely, iron and timber.  (United States Congress 
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1963)  At the same time as these domestic resources fed the industrialization of Sweden, they 
also fed the industrialization of other countries in Northern Europe, primarily with the United 
Kingdom, and this transit of raw materials would see innovation return to Sweden in the form of 
applicable new technologies.    (Bosworth and Maiolo, 2015) 
This growth, however, even as it continued through World War One and onwards into the 
1920s, was somewhat stifled given the Great Depression and the subsequent, at best awkward, 
state of economic affairs perpetrated by German intervention in the Scandinavian Peninsula 
during World War Two, an intervention coincidentally driven by the requirement by the Nazi 
war machine for Swedish iron ore.  (Bosworth and Maiolo 2015)  As with most of the western 
world, any economic takeoff would have to wait until the completion of World War 2.  Sweden 
was particularly slow to emerge right out of the gate in the post-war period-fears of a post-war 
recession kept wartime regulations and restrictions in place in many cases until the late 1950s.  
(Magnusson 2000, 204)  However, following dramatic capital investment in the 1950s and the 
startling postwar technology growth both in Sweden and worldwide, the Swedes experienced 
unprecedented economic prosperity.  (Magnusson 2000, 203-204)  The Social Democrats, who 
were in control of Swedish politics for the duration of this period, would leverage their success 
into finalizing the establishment of their long-desired welfare strategies and social policies.  This 
movement was aided by the natural economic narrowing of the income gap due to the sheer 
prosperity being experienced at the time.  While this phenomenon was notable even in the 1930s, 
it was truly realized in the prosperity of the post-war period.  (Magnusson 2000, 201) In the end, 
this combination of economic factors-prosperity, stability, the natural narrowing of the wage gap, 
and to a lesser extent the universal undertaking of rationing and material limitation, would be 




 When examining American economic history in relation to periods in which the 
establishment of a welfare state similar in capacity to that of Sweden, one is fortunate in being 
able to narrow down the timeframe to the post-industrial era.  No comprehensive modern welfare 
state has emerged prior to the beginning of the Industrial Era in a country as of yet.  As such, the 
American Industrial Revolution, beginning around the last decade of the 18
th
 century, is an 
excellent starting point at which to analyze American economics up until the modern era.  At the 
start of the American Industrial Revolution, according to the United States census of 1790, 
around 90% of the population was employed in the agrarian sector. (United States Census 1790)  
In 1890, the number of non-farm workers surpassed the number of farm workers for the first 
time, and, 200 years later, in 1990, farmers made up less than three percent of the US labor force.  
Much as in Sweden, capital investment and technological advancements, paralleled by the 
expansion of business interests and the rise of corporations, would drive industrial progress.  
(Investopedia 2015) 
 It was the second stage of the American Industrial Revolution, however, which began to 
come to fruition nearly a century later that would prove the defining study site for American 
emergence into a modern industrial society.  This was preceded by the increasing urbanization of 
American populations in the period between the Civil War and World War 1.  Along with this 
wave of urbanization came an increasing concentration of industrial facilities, a greater focus on 
sanitation, the rise of unionization, and the communication revolution that came about with the 
implementation of the radio and the telephone into everyday life.  This would see the start of a 
wave of economic growth in the United States, that, despite a significant slippage following the 
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Stock Market Crash in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression, would rebound by the end of 








Figure 6: Various countries and regions’ percentage of global GDP over time (Drabble 2016) 
 In this, America shares similarities with Sweden in that the events of World War Two, 
while radically different for both countries, with Sweden being firmly in the German geopolitical 
arena, and America at the forefront of the forces of the larger Allied western nations, would 
instigate strong economic development in the post-war arena, in large part due to the relative 
lack of population loss and, most importantly, infrastructure damage, taken during the events of 
the war.  (Government of Sweden 2016c)  In many cases, industries developed in such a way as 
to increase productivity and output due to the demands of the war efforts for both nations.  
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(Magnusson 2000, 202)  Combined with the aforementioned similarities in economic outlooks 
following the co-occurring post-war boom for both Sweden and the United States, it is only 
logical to look closely at the period directly following World War 2 as a strong candidate for 
inclusion as a part of the formati of Swedish social welfare.     
Swedish Demographics 
 Separating ethnic demographic data for the country of Sweden is a particularly difficult 
task, given that there are no official statistics on ethnicity gathered by the Swedish government.  
Regardless, a discerning investigator can extrapolate from a variety of statistics, whether 
peripheral or privately gathered measurements, the relative amount of immigrants in the 
population and the ethnic arrangement of the Swedish population.  The Swedish government 
does keep statistics on the numbers of immigrants coming into the country each year, and has 
done so since 1851.  At this early period, immigration into Sweden was next to nothing, while 
the population sat at just over three and a half million individuals.  (Government of Sweden 
2016d)  A significant spike in emigration, primarily to the United States and also Australia, 
occurred in the years characterized by the agricultural disaster known in Sweden as the “Final 
Famine”; a devastating event that triggered a significant migration of a large portion of the 
population, which during the period of time around 1866-1868 fled the country for these 
hopefully greener pastures.  (Akenson 2011)  This period would not see the end of large-scale 
Swedish emigration-rather, only the beginning, as large numbers of Swedes would emigrate to 
America from 1880-onwards, until the flow finally ceased in the years leading up to World    
War I.    
Emigration and immigration would each remain low up until the post-World War II 
period, at which point immigration would see a steady increase as Swedish economic prosperity 
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beckoned.  This would eventually lead to the government placing controls on immigration in the 
early 1970s, requiring proof of employment offers and housing arrangements, among other 
things, before individuals and families would be considered for approval for immigration.  
(Government of Sweden 2016d)   
 
Figure 7: Yugoslavian immigration to Sweden (Government of Sweden 2016d) 
The start of the modern-day skyrocketing of immigration to Scandinavia arrived in the 
1980s, when Sweden was one of the leading countries in taking in large numbers of asylum-
seeking individuals from conflict zones across the world, whether it be Chileans fleeing the 
regime of Pinochet (45,000 Chileans currently reside in Sweden), Somali migrants, Iranian and 
Iraqi civilians fleeing the brutal Iran-Iraq war (34,000 total form these countries alone in the 
1980s), and others from countries as diverse as Eritrea and Lebanon.  (Government of Sweden 
2016d)  Later, in the 1990s, Sweden would see a net uptick in gross immigration and in per 
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capita immigration ratios, with over 100,000 Bosnians alone being granted asylum during the 
decade.   
This pattern is still manifesting to this day, as the Swedes continue to take in refugees 
seeking safe haven as they flee from modern combat zones, such as Syria, Iraq, and Eritrea.  
Only Germany took in more asylum seekers in 2014 than Sweden, despite a dramatic population 
disparity between Sweden and Germany, and many of the countries in its regional sphere.  In 
2015, every fifth immigrant was from Syria alone, and the massive influx of refugees, especially 
recently, as begun to manifest stresses in the general population.  While surveys indicate that the 
vast majority of Swedes approve of immigration as a whole, these same surveys also indicate 
that the overall population feels as though the integration of immigrant populations could use 
refinement on a variety of levels.  (Government of Sweden 2016d)   Unrest over this issue has 
been seen as recently as the 2013 riots in the suburbs of Stockholm.   Overall, the trend of ethnic 
Swedish demographics has been one of a gradually escalating increase, with modest immigration 
activity through the 1960s, speeding up and growing larger and larger into the modern day.  This 
trend of increased immigration has contributed as well to the overwhelmingly urban nature of the 
Swedish population-more than 85% in 2015.  (World Bank 2016b)  How Swedes handle the 
growing and concentrated influx of culturally different peoples in their society will be one of the 

















 America, unlike Sweden, is well known worldwide as a melting pot, a diverse assortment 
of various peoples from a large number of world cultures.  While slightly less urbanized than 
Sweden, at an estimated 81% in 2015, America still experiences growing and concentrated 
minority populations, and has a long history, unlike Sweden, of significant portions of the 
population being of different ethnicities.  The most historically noteworthy minority population 
in the United States has been the African American population-originally imported largely as 
slaves for southern plantation work, etc. this population has grown consistently over the last two-
plus decades.  In addition to the black population, other groups, such as Hispanics, persons of 
Asian descent, and Native American populations have formed varyingly sizeable and significant 
minorities in the United States throughout time and into the modern era.  In the present day, one 
American in six is deemed Hispanic in origin, and Native American populations have historically 
existed, of course, since the dawn of the United States as a formalized nation-today they consist 
of around one percent of the total population of the United States, which is calculated at just 
under 309 million in 2010, and 321 million in 2015.  According to the 2010 United States 
Census, more than 1 in 10 American citizens were black, and one in twenty was of Asian 
descent.  The majority white population, as defined by the Census Bureau, registered just under 
64% of the population in 2010, with that number decreasing steadily through successive census 
counts.  (US Census 2016a)   This trend is expected to continue; The Economist estimated that 
by 2050 one in four Americans will be Hispanic, and that does not even account for potential 
















Figure 13: Native American population density in the United States (United States Census 2015) 
 
Figure 14: Immigrant population share over time in the United States (Fredlund-Blomst 2014) 
42 
 
Figure 15: Immigrant population versus percentage of the population in the United States 
(Migration Policy Institute 2015) 
 
Figure 16: Decadal representation of Immigrant population versus share of the United States 
population (Batalova and Zong 2016) 
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 From these charts, it is easy to establish that, like Sweden, the United States has a 
significant immigrant population.  Unlike Sweden, however, it is also evident that the United 
States’ significant immigrant populations have persisted further back in the history of the 
country. While slaves are unusual immigrants compared to what are today considered modern 
day immigrants, or even Swedish refugee-classified immigrants, forced immigration is still 
immigration by all accounts, census statistics show that the black population in 1800 was 
900,000 out of little more than 5.1 million Americans.  This indicates that the American 
immigrant population is both highly significant and endures all the way back to the foundation of 
the United States in the 1770s. This is a sociological and demographic phenomena that very 
obviously can lead to the affectation of social policies and agendas that could very conceivably 













 In the practice of the analysis of the rise of a social system as long in the making and as 
complex as the social policies of an entire modern nation, as is such with the Swedish welfare 
state, a particular manner of generalization must be embraced on a certain level at the very start 
of a study in order to reach a feasible conclusion, lest one become bogged down in the mess of 
mundane details affecting the peculiarities of such a large entity as the social welfare system of 
an entire modern country consisting of millions of people.  For example, while it is entirely 
possible that tariff levels on imported grain in the mid-1800s may have had a trickle-down effect 
leading to the promotion of Swedish agriculture at the time, and that may have been a precursor 
to some sort of welfare relief among the hungry poor, it is more likely that that is but a spurious 
variable distracting from a more pressing happenstance that more conclusively led to the 
establishment of the modern Swedish welfare state.  One must not only keep in mind the 
potentially distracting nature of smaller variables like the aforementioned tariff levels on 
imported grain, but also the potentially distracting nature of larger more significant seeming 
variables.   
It is with such an outlook that the analysis of the Swedish welfare state has been crafted; 
with the specific intent of determining these particular significant groupings of events and 
periods of crucial and significant importance, that the underlying aspects mainly driving the 
creation of the Swedish welfare state can be identified, collected, summarized, and analyzed.  
The matter by which this must be undertaken is almost entirely qualitative at its most basic, 
beginning level.  Quantitative facts, such as economic data concerning post-war prosperity, 
population and demographic metrics, and election data concerning differences between Swedish 
and American political practices, are useful to the analysis primarily once the primary areas of 
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focus have been identified qualitatively.  I argue that unless qualitative analysis can be used to 
align identified phenomena and their respective timeframes together to establish a causal link 
between the individual phenomena and the greater, cumulative, long-term effort of the creation 
of the welfare state itself, no truly overarchingly meaningful conclusions can be reached.   
These conclusions, however, can only be achieved through the accumulation of a series 
of what are highly important quantitative statistics covering the multi-faceted conditions 
surrounding the two welfare states seen and discussed in Sweden and the United States.   The 
most important of these critical quantitative variables are demographic, economic, and political. 
Although the aforementioned qualitative aspect of the analysis is of primary importance, the 
combination of relevant data sets from these areas, comparing and contrasting between United 
States’ statistics and Swedish statistics, can provide essential causal links, demonstrating both 
reasons for and against the creation and perpetration of the relative welfare states in both 
countries.  It is for this reason that we will attempt to establish a significant correlative link 
between racial statistics, welfare spending, and many other statistical areas in discerning the 
“push” behind the conception and continuation of these states.   
Concerning the formational conditions surrounding the rise of the Swedish welfare state, 
first, one must start by analyzing the changes necessary to begin the formation of such a social 
welfare system.  It is logically conclusive, given the natural uniqueness of the Swedish welfare 
state, that a particular arrangement of events characterized by their selectively and consecutively 
occurring nature must be present in such an environment in order to ensure the formation of 
varying social policies forming the actual underlying bedrock of the Swedish-style social welfare 
state.  Given this logical assumption, it can then be assumed that a confluence of events from a 
variety of different spheres-economic, political, demographic, etc.- impacting the creation and 
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maintenance of the welfare state spheres would have to comport themselves in such a way as to 
formulate the gestation of said welfare state.  This identification of specific catalysts to the 
creation of the oft-aforementioned social welfare system is best facilitated by first determining 
the timeframe of the establishment of the social welfare system.  This is less a matter of 
academic investigation and more a simpler matter of a thorough examination of Swedish history, 
specifically historical social welfare policymaking.   Once potentially relevant have been 
identified-through careful perusal of the historical record-a prudent researcher can then look 
deeper into the factors behind these occurrences and determine the significant impacting factors, 
be they economic, political, external, internal, etc.  To summarize: 
 The timeframe of the establishment of the Swedish welfare state can be determined 
through a recording of the timeframe in which the policies and relevant events that 
contributed to the structure of the Swedish welfare state were enacted or occurred. 
 After determining the correct period, a researcher can then formulate a listing of potential 
spheres of analysis through which to attempt to discern causality concerning the 
aforementioned sphere and the formation of the welfare state.  For example, economics, 
politics, international relations, etc.   
 After determining the specific sphere of analysis, for example, economics, that influenced 
the creation of the welfare state, more precise analysis can be undertaken to determine 
both a timeframe of consequential events, policies, and proceedings, and a collection of 
consequential events and proceedings.   For example, perhaps World War 2 closely 
coincides with the implementation of significant Swedish social welfare policies. 
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 After this narrowing down of analyses has completed, the researcher should be left with, 
assuming a thorough approach to all of the aforementioned steps, a comprehensive listing 
of potential significant factors leading to the formation of the Swedish welfare state.   
 These candidate significant factors can then be carefully analyzed qualitatively and 
quantitatively to determine whether or not they provided significant impetus towards the 
formation of the Swedish welfare state.  As stated before, there is a significant amount of 
difficulty and care must be taken in attempting to determine the difference between 
variables contributing to the formation and evolution of the Swedish welfare state and 
variables contributing to the evolution of the Swedish state, economy, and society as a 
whole that may not have a significant impact on the welfare state itself.   
 The significant factors can then be compared to their American counterparts in an attempt 
to determine with finality whether the country of the United States has had a window of 
opportunity, as defined by a significant similarity in formational significant factors, for 
the formation of a Swedish-style social welfare state.  It is then a relatively simple matter 
to determine either the correlation in the American social welfare system, or the lack 
thereof.  In such a case as the latter, it is postulated that the difference would be readily 
identifiable based on the comparison of significant formational factors.   
 
Through this analytical framework a variety of goals can be achieved. First, the 
determination of the timeframe of the establishment of the Swedish welfare state.  Second, the 
identification of possible significant factors in said establishment.  Finally, weeding out of these 
factors to determine which are specifically related to the formation of the Swedish welfare state.  
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These factors can then be compared to their American counterparts, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, in the hopes of determining whether the United States has had a window in which 
the assumption of a Swedish-style social welfare state would have been feasible, and if such a 
window does not exist, then it is hoped that continued analysis of the aforementioned factors can 

















In keeping with the first step of the proscribed methodology for determining the 
significant factors behind the rise of the modern Swedish welfare state, it can be concluded that 
the best course of action is to first identify events primarily critical to the development of the 
Swedish welfare system.  As such, it can be firmly noted that academic consensus and historical 
record place the early concrete development, policy-wise, of the modern Swedish welfare state to 
be around the turn of the 20th century, shortly following the rise of the Social Democrat party 
which would rapidly grow to champion and drive these changes.   Some of these policy 
enactments are, in chronological order: in 1909 male suffrage was established, followed by 
industrial safety laws (1912), old-age pension insurance (1913), universal suffrage for men and 
women (1918), the establishment of the eight hour work day (1919), laws on collective 
bargaining (1928), maternity benefits and maintenance allowances (1937), two weeks of holiday 
leave minimum 1948), and general child allowances (1948).  As the Swedish economy began to 
boom in the post-war early 1950s period, additional reforms would arise, including three weeks 
mandatory vacation (1953), national health insurance (1955), a forty five hour working week and 
earnings-related pensions (1960), housing subsidies for families with children (1969), job 
security legislation (1974), and reduced pension age (1976).  (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 8)  
Throughout this period of policy implementation, refinement of previously implemented social 
welfare policies was on going; the workweeks’ length was steadily shortened, mandated vacation 
time was steadily extended, and benefits were increased.  (Heclo and Madsen 1987, 8)  After this 
time period, policy implementation took a back seat to policy refinement-new statutes and 
policies were introduced less often, and existing policies and social welfare stratagems were 
refined to allow for a more functional system.  Therefore, having established a timeline for the 
50 
 
concrete enactment of the social welfare system in Sweden, it was then prudent to look at this 
time period, stretching roughly from way back in the early 1900s to the late 1970s, and peruse 
this era through the lens of Swedish politics, policy, demographics, economics, international 
relations, land reform, international trade, conflict, immigration, and whatever other factors 
could potentially be significantly applicable to the establishment of this welfare system.   
In the following examination of this era concerning varying potential applicable areas of 
influence on the formation of the Swedish welfare state, a series of applicable areas were 
identified as potentially housing more specific significant contributory factors to the rise of the 
Swedish welfare state.  These areas arrived at as potential candidates after months of analysis of 
a multitude of previously cited works throughout this paper, were, specifically, land reform, 
economic, political, and demographic.  Land reform was selected based on the seeming 
importance of the great and rather unusual for the time Swedish land reforms of the 1700s, 
namely the storskifte of 1749 and the cumulative Land Survey ordinance of 1783.  (Magnusson 
2000, 15)  It was postulated that these events would have had contributed to a socioeconomic 
impetus driving the establishment of the modern day welfare state in Sweden. 
No examination of the formative period of practically any social welfare system is 
complete without a comprehensive analysis of the economic factors included in redistributive 
efforts at the state level.  Sweden is no different, with a number of critical economic events 
occurring during the same period as the establishment of the welfare state itself.  Among these 
are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the post-war economic boom of the 1950s, 1960s, and 
the early 1970s; up until the oil crisis and other events curtailed it somewhat.   
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A third area of interest, politics, is readily apparent upon discovering that during this 
formational period of Swedish welfare, a single party, the Social Democrat party, was in power 
in Sweden for the greater part of the period mentioned previously in which the concrete policy 
enactment took place, and were constantly in power in the Riksdag from 1932-1976; the primary 
foundational period of Swedish social welfare policymaking.  That this party was and is even 
still today a primary driver of modern social welfare policy in Sweden would seem to indicate 
their relation to the establishment of the welfare state. 
The final identified area of significant interest, in the important effect it might have had 
on the formation of the Swedish welfare state, was demographics; up until recently and certainly 
during the aforementioned foundational period of the early-middle 1900s, Sweden experienced 
relatively low levels of immigration, whereas the United States has experienced higher levels of 
continuous immigration and the population itself has evolved into one of the largest countries on 
Earth, cresting 323 million as of July 2016.  (US Census 2016b) Sweden on the other hand, only 
now approaches a population of 10 million, with official reports estimating the population at 
around 9.8 million as of April 2016. (Statistics Sweden 2016b)  Given prevailing racial attitudes 
in both countries, this required further consideration concerning the potential importance of these 
variables to both study site countries.  This is especially critical given the significant role 
possessed by racial bias in social welfare formation or lack thereof.  Many who analyze 
redistributive efforts have noted the influence of racial disparity and attitudes in the formation 
and evolution of welfare states throughout history and across the world. 
After the collection of these important factors for consideration, further work was done to 
attempt to determine the legitimacy of the proposed areas as actual significant influences on the 
rise of the welfare state.  Of the four aforementioned areas that were considered, three were 
52 
 
deemed conclusively significant as indicated by the research; economics, politics, and 
demographics.  Land reform, while significantly important to the history of Sweden itself and 
what can only be assumed are a multitude of other geographic, historical, and sociological areas 
of study, was deemed to be less than significant to the study of the formation of the Swedish 
welfare state.  Despite the highly unusual nature of the reforms for their time period, being 
remarkably egalitarian and very much in contrast with overarching attitudes across Europe, no 
significant connection was found in Swedish history to suggest a land reform jumpstarted a 
social impetus for increasing redistributive policy. 
 Concerning the effect of economics on the rise of the social welfare system in Sweden, 
several key time periods were identified that were crucial to its successful implementation.  
Firstly, the industrial advances around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which laid the 
framework for modern Swedish industrialization, would be an important contributor to future 
highly significant economic upswings that would co-occur with and help to drive policy 
implementation.  Secondly, the Great Depression and World War II would provide both a taste 
of hardship and the precursors to the expansion of the global economy.  In addition, the events of 
and the relatively advantageous position held by Sweden following the conclusion of World War 
Two would lead to the most crucial of all of the economic indicators of the significant effect of 
economics on the formation of Swedish welfare policies; the post-World War Two economic 
boom, which would go hand in hand through the mid-1970s with the driving by the Social 
Democrats of the meat of their social welfare agenda.   
Demographics are, and have been, another key driver of Swedish social welfare policy in 
the era of the evolution of its welfare state.  As explained in detail in a variety of academic 
articles, not the least of which a study by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research titled Why 
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Doesn’t the US Have A European-Style Welfare State?, racial concerns belied by underlying 
demographic arrangements can be a key contributor towards a lack of wealth redistribution 
towards the poor-which would hamper, not help, the formation of a social welfare system such as 
has been seen to arise in Sweden.  In specific regard to the American comparison to the matter of 
the Swedish welfare state formation, the Harvard report specifically states that their findings 
indicated, “Racial animosity in the US makes redistribution to the poor…unappealing to many 
voters.”  (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)  
In an attempt to conclusively examine impact of racial bias on efforts to implement a 
comprehensively redistributive system in the Swedish style, statistical analysis was undertaken 
on the area of American demographics in an attempt to verify the significant impact of racial bias 
on economic redistribution.  Firstly, an analysis of American demographics and their relationship 
to redistributive policy were deemed to be best examined on the state level, given comparative 
ease of access to data and the ability to sort states by overriding political influence, be it of the 
Democratic Party or the Republican Party.  This was also thought to assist in determining 
whether right or left leaning political alignments are more or less inclined towards more 
redistributive welfare policies overall and also when sorted by racial group.  Areas for which 
data was compiled include urban, rural, and total state populations, welfare spending per capita 
(defined as combined Medicaid and public assistance spending per capita), white, black, Asian, 
and Hispanic percentages of state populations, welfare spending as a percentage of state GDP, 
and whether or not the state is primarily Democratic or Republican.  The latter was determined 
by the simple process of counting the number of representatives and senators from the respective 
states concerning their declared party; whichever party had the most representation was deemed 
to hold influence in that state.   
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From this data, a number of Pearson product-moment correlational analyses were 
undertaken, which tested the correlational values of per capita welfare spending with varying 
racial groups.  Further specification was achieved by running the same tests but separating out 
the data for Republican and Democratic states, in attempt to reveal whether left-leaning, 
Democratic states, or right-leaning, Republican states, would be more inclined towards 
redistributive efforts.  Additional metrics were taken to determine average spending on welfare 
as a percentage of GDP between Republican and Democratic states, non-white population 
percentages between Republican and Democratic states, specific racial group population 
percentages of states, and welfare spending per capita, again divided by state political alignment.  
 Given the Swedish example in particular, and similar European examples in general, it is 
expected that left-leaning parties are more likely to support a larger scale of expansion and 
development of welfare policies in the Swedish style.  Considering again in combination with 
this the prior assertion that racial bias drives a lack of redistributive efforts in the Swedish style, 
it was hypothesized that the data analysis would show the left-leaning democratic states would 
have higher correlations between redistribution and minority populations.  At the same time, it 
was expected that white populations would see higher rates of redistribution in right-leaning 
states, given their status as the majority ethnicity.   
 Results for the Pearson product moment correlational analyses indicate much of what was 
expected in terms of the demographically driven redistributive disparity among racial groups in 
the United States.  Given the results below, it is plain to see that when adjusting for state political 
alignment, left leaning states show a higher correlational value between increased welfare 




Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage .0049 
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage -.2131 
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage -.0139 
Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage (Republican States) .1798 
Per Capita Total Spending and White Population percentage (Democratic States) .1547 
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage (Republican States) -.3705 
Per Capita Total Spending and Black Population percentage (Democratic States) .0931 
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage (Republican States) -.1462 
Per Capita Total Spending and Hispanic Population percentage (Democratic States) -.0228 
  
To summarize the above data, Republican states showed lower correlations between 
welfare spending and Hispanic, Black, and White populations.  Additionally, the correlational 
value when looking at White population percentage and welfare spending was higher in 
Republican states than in Democrat states, indicating a higher level of willingness to support 
welfare among more homogenous populations.  However, both states showed the highest 
correlational values among those measured when looking at White Population percentage. 
Demographically, Sweden, on the other hand, during the period established as 
formational for the Swedish welfare state, has lacked the significant racial tensions and multiple 
large minority populations inherent in the United States’ demographic arrangement.  That 
Sweden is possessed of significant minority populations is very obvious-the lasting presence of 
the Sami has been noteworthy throughout Swedish history, and today they are granted a certain 
elevated measure of autonomy in governing their own semi-independent affairs.  Additionally, a 
significant effort has been undertaken to ensure the attempted preservation of Sami culture.  
(Government of Sweden 2016e)  However, compared to the United States, Sweden has a very 
low minority population.  89.3% of the population identifies themselves as specifically 
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“Swedish”, with only a small fraction identifying themselves as another ethnic group.  (This 
compared to the United States, where minorities number in the low to mid 30% range.) Amongst 
this minority group, further illuminating the relative homogeneity of the Swedish population, 
native Sami people and Swedish Finns dominate.  (Statistics Sweden 2016b)  
In Anthony Smith’s arguments for the independence of “nations” and “states”, he goes so 
far as to include Sweden in a very short list of states where the cultural unity is comprehensive 
throughout the state’s territories, in the sense that the immigrant and minority native peoples of 
Sweden do not impair the cultural unity of the country as a whole.  The United States is not on 
the short list.   
He argues in addition that statewide institutions such as the Swedish social welfare 
system function only in environments of widespread cultural homogeneity across a state’s 
entirety-conditions, which he also argues do not exist in the United States.  (Smith 1986 263)     
Thomas Faist contends that America’s lasting racial divides have impeded any progress 
by the generally labeled “social democrats” in establishing anything resembling the more 
advanced social support structure seen in European states such as Sweden.  (Faist 1995) These 
demographic characteristics obviously cannot be taken as the sole overriding reason for the lack 
of the development of a social welfare system similar to that of Sweden in the United States; 
however, that it is a significant factor appears definite.   
Politically, a series of events and proceedings were found to have provided a significant 
impetus towards the foundation of the Swedish welfare state.  As early as the turn of the first 
millennia A.D., Viking regional taxation and country-wide institution implementation served as 
obvious precursors for modern Swedish social institutions and policy arrangements.   It is worth 
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noting that similar historical parallels do not exist in American culture, given its relative youth as 
a country and the suppression of Native American influence following the suppression of that 
native population.  Further events, such as the growing of power of the Riksdag in the 1700s and 
1800s, and the formation of the Social Democrat party during the industrialization and 
unionization spree that began in the late 1800s would also serve to drive the formation of the 
welfare state in a multitude of significant fashions.   
The political stability that is a commonplace stereotype of Sweden in particular and 
Scandinavia as a whole was lent in large part to its modern reputation by the dominance of 
Swedish politics during the 20
th
 century and onwards by the Social Democrats, for whom the 
modern Swedish social welfare state was a primary aspired goal; a goal which they were given 
the political and economic opportunity to see through until its completion by the aforementioned 
longevity of their dominant political interests in Sweden, which coincided in large part with the 
post-World War Two economic boom. This continuity and clear access to purpose is a blatantly 
obvious contributor to the establishment of a welfare state, and it is equally obvious that such a 
parallel does not exist in the history of the United States.  American political alignment being 
much more polarized, it is noteworthy for a single party to remain in power beyond the term 
limit of a single executive, never mind the decades of uninterrupted power enjoyed by the Social 
Democrats.  Judging by the Swedish model, the establishment of a welfare state is a lengthy, 
decades long process, and given the readily apparent significance of political continuity, and the 
lack thereof in the United States, it can be noted that this would form an impediment to the 
formation of a Swedish style welfare state.   
In brief summary, then, events have been organized under the auspices of three main 
spheres of influence on the formation of the modern Swedish welfare state-events of economic, 
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political, and demographic natures.  In comparing these events to American history in an attempt 
to find logical and suitable comparisons, some connections were made, while others were limited 
to a certain extent.  American economic indicators were found to correlate strongly with 
Sweden-a post war boom is clearly seen, as are adverse effects from the Great Depression and a 
lack of infrastructure damage from World War Two.    However, the other two key areas of 
influence in Swedish social welfare state formation are not found to correlate significantly with 
American historical record.  American politics have for no reasonably comparable period of time 
been dominated by a single party, never mind one of the inclination to provide a social welfare 
net as broad as that implemented by the Social Democrats in Sweden over the course of 45+ odd 
years.  Additionally, American disregard for Soviet-related practices such as socialism led to an 
inherent disregard for social welfare practices on the Swedish scale. (Alesina, Sacerdote, and 
Glaeser 2001 26) Demographically, as well, America is unsuitable for the replication of the 
conditions found in the formation of the modern Swedish welfare state.  The significantly 
increased presence of and marginalization of minorities in America as opposed to Sweden has 
served to divide the population and prevent majority opinion swaying towards the redistribution 
of wealth to these marginalized “otherized” populations.  Statistical analyses determining the 









 Any dialogue regarding the events concerning the rise of the modern day Swedish social 
welfare and their potential parallels in American history is incomplete without a comprehensive 
analysis of the similarities and differences between the economics, politics, and demographics of 
the two nations.  In analyzing the differing aspects of these various spheres of two separate 
nations as different and alike as the United States and Sweden, significant correlations and the 
equally meaningful lacks thereof can be found; these qualitative conclusions and quantitative 
datum can then be utilized to great effect in discerning the foundational aspects of the modern 
day Swedish welfare system and its summary potential past-application to the United States of 
America.  In the analysis of the events leading to the rise of the Swedish welfare system, and in 
summarily analyzing their potential counterparts in American economics, demographics, and 
politics, it is clear that a number of observations can be made as to the nature of this relationship, 
whether correlation exists between the varying spheres of connectivity or not. 
 No discussion of any social welfare system is complete without an underlying analysis of 
the economic nature of the study site at hand.  Social welfare systems are at their heart vessels of 
the redistribution of wealth-mostly from richer, better-off individuals to those less well off, or 
skirting the fringe of poverty.  It is a logical fact that redistribution only functions effectively 
when significant wealth is available for redistribution.  What primarily, policy-wise, makes 
Scandinavian-style social welfare states, most specifically Sweden, different from a welfare state 
such as the modern American welfare state, is the scale and level of government involvement in 
regulating and ensuring public health; through a relatively high level of influence over direct care 
and public health insurance, public policymaking, and by way of benefits for workers, parents, 
and students.   
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Furthermore, the Swedish welfare state is different from the American welfare state, 
(And an oft-used comparison for the American welfare state) given the relatively more positive 
quality of life and economic equality indicators seen in Sweden versus the United States.  US 
News ranks Sweden’s quality of life as second in the world; Business Insider ranks them second 
as well in the same metric, and the United Nations ranks Sweden’s human development index at 
14
th
 in the world.  (US News 2016) (United Nations Development Programme 2014) (Willet 
2013)  At the same time, in all of these polls and almost every other poll and metric measuring 
economic equality, quality of life, development, etc., the United States falls significantly behind 
the Swedes.  Many of the statistics use to calculate these figures, such as life expectancy and 
Gini coefficients are a direct result of the influence or lack thereof of the welfare state in both 
countries.  From this, we can conclude at the very least the concept of a Swedish style welfare 
state is an idea to be considered hypothetically concerning the potential benefits it might have on 
American quality of life.   
Regardless, it is obvious by a multitude of economic metrics-GDP PPP, GDP per capita, 
etc., that Sweden is one of the most prosperous nations in Europe and certainly in the world as a 
whole.  This prosperity bloomed almost simultaneously alongside the constant implementation of 
social welfare policies during the period from the start of the 20
th
 century to the 1970s.  Is it 
essential to note the impact several formative historical events had on this correlation; the Great 
Depression, the industrial growth of the 1800s, and specifically World War Two.  It is not a pre-
requisite to the establishment of a social welfare state, in particular a Scandinavian-style heavy 
benefits system, that the country sustain a lack of  infrastructure damage during World War Two.  
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark have notable levels of social 
welfare policy implementation despite suffering from varyingly increased degrees of loss during 
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World War Two.  Regardless, the Swedes relatively undamaged position emerging from the 
World War Two era into the post-war period gave them a leg up on their competitors in 
emerging into the post Breton Woods/GATT world of economic globalization.  This leg up, as it 
were, alongside the unquestioned domestic popularity afforded the Social Democratic leadership 
as a result of the co-occurring countrywide economic prosperity, served to drive policy 
implementation.  It is left inconclusively explained by this work as to whether the opposite is the 
case-that the policies enacted by the Social Democrats during the post-war period contributed in 
significant ways towards what can be clearly delineated by metrics as, even by the standards of 
post-World War economic booms, remarkable economic progress in Sweden.   
Demographically, a variety of important conclusions can be drawn that illuminate some 
of the differences between America and Sweden, and, more specifically, their welfare policies.  
Statistical analyses both from this paper and other sources support the assertion that 
redistributive efforts in the United States are especially marginalized when higher non-majority-
race populations are present.  At the same time, left-leaning states in the United States are more 
likely to redistribute with the presence of higher minority populations as opposed to right-leaning 
states.  (Left-leaning states being more similar to the more mainstream Swedish political parties)  
It is important to note that in the United States, both conservative and liberal parties both show 
higher correlation between welfare spending and majority white populations than they do on 
welfare spending and minority black and Hispanic populations.  These two conclusions alone 
support the idea that the relatively homogenous Sweden is more racially inclined towards 
redistribution than the more heterogeneous United States.   
At the same time, Swedish minorities trend much more towards the Caucasian majority 
than in the United States-the major minority populations in Sweden are light-skinned peoples 
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native to the area, whereas in the United States darker skinned populations of African Americans 
and Hispanics often live in areas geographically distant compared to Swedish minorities.  This 
indicates that the perceived racial gap between the majority American racial group and the 
majority Swedish racial group is even larger than a simple delineation by skin color; that the 
racial gap is compounded not just by appearance and racial bias but by cultural and historical 
differences which are manifest much more strongly in the United States.  Summarily, it can be 
assumed that racial bias in the United States significantly hampers redistributive efforts on a 
scale not seen in Sweden.    
In a similar pattern to that seen in the United States, the cessation of social welfare 
policies correlated positively with the increased influx of immigrants to Sweden.  Given the 
aforementioned observation of the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, that American 
welfare has been limited by social opposition to redistribution to the poor and to minority 
populations, one must consider the concept of whether or not the influx of immigrants 
contributed to this tailing off of welfare policy.  However, given that the immigrant surge has 
only just begun in Sweden, relative to the centuries of significant immigration in the history of 
the United States, it is too early to accurately gauge its effectiveness at changing Swedish social 
welfare policy.  At the same time, the oil crises of the 1970s and the general economic downturn 
of this period as the post-war boom tailed off in Sweden, amongst, among other things, increased 
market competition from countries like Japan, may have contributed to this tailing off of 
policymaking.  Not only does this engender the follow-up question of what event(s) specifically 
caused the tapering implementation of widespread new policy implementation in Sweden, but 
also whether these events correlate to similar events in the United States, as the formational 
events leading to the enactment of the policies did in a portion of the analyzed areas.   
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At the same time, the origin of immigrants is an important complication in the discussion 
of the effect demographics and ethnic minorities have on policy implementation.  A large 
amount of Swedish immigrants are refugees from war zones, while the vast majority of 
American immigrants, historically, have been through the slave trade or, more recently, 
immigrants searching for a brighter future in a perceived land of opportunity, often from at the 
time beset European, Asian, or Central and South American locales.  This variation is 
undoubtedly a contributor to the different treatment received by immigrant populations in the 
respective countries.  (Smith 1986)  It is thus possible, and worth examining further in a future 
study, whether it is that the purpose of immigration is as important as the immigration of the 
individual on its own in determining overall social reactions to immigration and the subsequent 
reactions as seen through the lens of policymaking affected by said immigration.   
Politically, the fact that the Social Democrats championed the formative nature of the 
Swedish welfare state and shepherded it into its modern iteration, and continue to do so today, is 
unquestionably a defining reason that the social welfare system has arrived at its particular state 
of refinement in Sweden.  The duration of their control of Swedish politics is remarkable in a fair 
democratic society-it is rare that a single party holds power for more than a decade, never mind 
more than four decades, during some of the most turbulent times of the 20
th
 century.  This 
singular unity of Swedish politics, along with uncharacteristic, at least from an American 
perspective, community-centered logic and empathy in policymaking seems deserving of special 
mention.  Regardless, the simplistic nature of their electoral dominance over Swedish politics 
and their avowed devotion to redistributive and competitive social welfare programs endeavors 
to create a mockery of in-depth analysis, as none is needed to see the role they played in the 
formation of Swedish social welfare policy.   That similar continuity would have a similar effect 
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on American politics is a logical assumption, however, the nature of the political party in 
question would no doubt engender a measure of doubt as to the potential affectation of a more 
comprehensive and redistributive welfare environment.  For example, a modern day Republican 
period of control lasting several decades would at this point be unlikely to result in increased 
social welfare, especially given the statistical findings on redistributive hindrances in populations 


















 Research into the rise of the modern social welfare state system in Sweden has yielded 
interesting datum concerning how the system came into being, and the identification of these 
factors behind the foundation of the welfare system offer markers by which we can identify 
similar situations in different countries.  At the same time, if one intended to project the future 
nature of a state’s welfare system, these variables could themselves be anticipated to see if such a 
system’s formation could indeed perhaps be on the horizon.   
Analysis of the history of Sweden indicated a variety of factors significant to the 
formation of the modern Swedish welfare state.  Economics, politics, and demographics were 
identified as the key areas contributing to formation of the Swedish welfare state.  Furthermore, 
specific facets of these three spheres of study concerning the rise of social welfare were 
recognized as especially formative aspects in their respective areas in regard to the impetus 
behind the implementation of the social policies underlying the welfare system.   
Economically, industrialization, World War Two, and the post-World War Two 
economic boom were identified as key contributors towards the economic characteristics later 
deemed necessary to formulate the modern day social welfare policies.  Industrialization 
centered on the end of the 19
th
 century and the start of the 20
th
 century set the stage for the 
economic conditions necessary for the post-World War Two economic boom.  World War Two 
itself, while globally devastating, was less so for Sweden-despite economic interruptions and 
rationing during wartime, along with the shrinkage of the Swedish export market during the war, 
Sweden emerged into the post-war period with its infrastructure relatively intact, and in some 
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industries new levels of productivity had been reached due to wartime demand for materials, 
such as steel.  (Magnusson 2000)  The post-war boom in Sweden was driven by the increasing 
globalization of world trade and the aforementioned head start enjoyed by Swedish industries, 
given the lack of destruction visited upon the country during the conflict.  Additional treaties 
such as the GATT and the Breton Woods agreement also served to strengthen the post-war 
economy.  (Schön 2012)   
Demographically, the relative homogeneity of the Swedish population until the bulk of 
policy implementation passed in the mid-1970s was determined to be a significant factor in the 
social support for the implementation of welfare policy-individuals were deemed more likely to 
approve of redistributive government policy in the presence of a relatively homogenous 
population.  (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001)  At the same time, comparative analysis of 
Swedish and American demographics showed a decreased impetus for redistribution based on 
higher minority populations in America as a whole.   It can be safely concluded from this data 
and other studies performed on the effects of racial bias on redistribution in America that the role 
of racial bias is a significant one in the  hindrance of redistributive efforts such as those in the 
Swedish style.   
Politically, the single greatest direct policy driver of Swedish welfare system 
implementation during the 20
th
 century was the Social Democrat party-founded in 1889 in close 
concert with the unions also forming at the time, they would come into power in 1932 and 
remain in leadership of the Riksdag and the Swedish government for more than forty years until 
the economic unrest of the mid-1970s would unsettle the Swedish political machine.  The 
welfare state was the prime project of the Social Democrats, and they used their lengthy political 
influence, the prosperity of the economy under their keeping, and the social support for the 
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welfare state to implement and refine welfare in Sweden for more than 40 years, eventually 
culminating in today’s modern Swedish welfare state.   
 Upon the individual analysis of each of these differing fields of study, geographic 
analysis was essential to the tying together of varying loose ideas from each of these content 
areas.  The differing geographic scale of Sweden and the United States formed a major boundary 
for cross-comparison between American and Swedish data sets, necessitating a combinative 
analysis that was by necessity, geographic in nature.  Only through such a broad lens could the 
specific effects of homogeneity, economics, demographics, and political influence be measure 
and compared effectively.   
The Rise of the Welfare State in Sweden; a Correlating American Window? 
Aspects of American society today, viewed from a certain angle, invite the attractiveness 
of the Swedish social welfare state.  An efficient, logical government, lower inequality, higher 
benefits, free health insurance, cheap higher education, and a high standard of living and health 
care all would be considerable draws towards the common middle and lower-class American 
citizen.  Therefore, the second phase of the research beyond the identification of the formative 
aspects of Swedish social welfare asked if the same factors identified as significant contributors 
to the rise of the modern Swedish social welfare state could be identified as similarly co-
occurring in American history; in essence, was there a window in which an American social 
welfare system could have been a reality?  In short, this question has proven to be a dead end.  
Indeed; the post-World War II economic framework favored America tremendously and during 
this time the United States prospered economically, much as Sweden had in the same time 
period.  The economic framework for the establishment of a social welfare state was present.  
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Indeed, as the world’s leading economy, one could argue that the economic window is still open 
for America up to the modern day.  Regardless, the other two spheres of influence on the rise of 
the Swedish welfare state were rather remarkably different compared to their American 
counterparts.  While Sweden experienced relative demographic homogeneity during the period 
of social welfare policy implementation, America has never really been demographically 
homogenous since its foundation, and to exacerbate that discrepancy, while Sweden has a 
relatively benign opinion of minority populations, America is not notable for such tolerance.  
Oppression of minorities has been an American staple for hundreds of years, and even to this 
day, for example, figures as elevated as presidential nominees continue to “otherize” minorities 
to great popular appeal.  This lack of demographic and cultural homogeneity has been shown 
time and again by researchers from a myriad of fields to attribute directly to the impedance of the 
implementation of any large-scale Swedish-style welfare system, particularly in America.   
Additionally, American politics have a history of significantly more variance than 
achieved by Swedish politics during the aforementioned policy implementation period in 
Sweden.  It can be safely assumed that a vast majority of Americans have never strongly 
considered the notion that a single political party might dominate the government for more than a 
handful of executive terms, never mind the four-plus decades of control enjoyed by the Social 
Democrats.  This lengthy time period is necessary to build the support and policy framework 
necessary to build and refine a system as comprehensive and inclusive as the modern Swedish 






The broad nature of the research into the formative variables of an entire welfare state 
brought into being over the course of decades concerns a number of factors and influencing 
variables that beggars the imagination.  Further examination of the intricacies of the interactions 
between varying spheres of influence, both aforementioned (economic, political and 
demographic) and not, would surely only serve to highlight more questions regarding the role of 
various factors in the impetus to bring about the formation of the welfare policies.  Did the 
proximity of communist Russia have an influence on the relatively redistributive Swedish 
system?  Did the relative lack of a classical Middle Ages feudal system in Sweden make a 
difference in the rapid adoption of a Scandinavian-style social welfare state?  To what degree did 
ostensible Scandinavian unity have on the formation of not just the Swedish welfare state, but the 
Finnish, Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic states as well?  In regards to the comparison of 
Swedish welfare-formative factors with their proposed potential American counterparts, what 
role does the classification of immigrants play in the adoption of redistributive policies?  Are 
Swedish refugees from dangerous combat zones viewed differently than American immigrants 
from around the world?  Did the American legacy of slavery affect redistributive policy towards 
a poor population composed disproportionately of members of this formerly oppressed 
population?  As with the research question itself, further inquiries can only be defined by the 
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